MARCIN MAKOWSKI: Should start preparing for a war with Russia?
SŁAWOMIR DĘBSKI: To answer that question, it is imperative that we first understand where it all began. For at least 10 years Russia has been unilaterally using war an as instrument of foreign policy, forcing new political arrangements onto its neighbours and other partners on the international scene. What does it entail? When it comes to Georgia and Ukraine the goal was to stem their aspirations to join NATO and the European Union in the bud and also to put pressure on the West for it not to entice Kiev or Tbilisi into its "zone of influence". Since at least 1993, Russia has been trying to re-shape the status quo in such a way as to establish a grey buffer zone between it and NATO countries in Central Europe. Just for that reason alone, we have to take into account Russia using force against countries on its western flank in the future. Such as scenario may be probable at a time when US forces are engaged in a conflict in another part of the world. When the media is focused on something else and NATO lacks decisiveness, Russia may opt to repeat the Crimean scenario. In a report published recently, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an American think tank, outlines just such a turn of events. NATO is unable to effectively check Russia's local aggression, who is taking over parts of member states' territories and expects negotiations sanctioning the aggression as an accomplished fact. Analysts warn that this might be a way to undermine the authority of the US Army in other regions, such as the Pacific, which might trigger a domino effect, the effects of which are difficult to predict. That report as well as many others show that Americans are increasingly more often thinking about their military strategy as an interconnected whole, based on the global component. During the Cold War, deterrence had a single goal – in our region it aimed to arrest the export of communism to the rest of Europe. However, since then the world had changed from bipolar (NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact) to multipolar. In the US, the conflict with China is beginning to be discussed more openly, and thus deterrence has to assume a global aspect. And that is why – as you've mentioned – if the US loses confidence in Europe, then Beijing may see that as a weakness and pursue a more aggressive policy in the far East. And America's recent actions, such as its withdrawal from the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), should be view in just such a context. Arguments behind that decision were not only to do with Russia. There is no doubt that Washington decided that Moscow is failing to observe the provisions of the treaty signed in 1987 and is developing its weapons systems despite of the ban, however the other argument present in this debate pertained to the Middle Kingdom.
Which, without having its hands tied by the treaty, was edging ahead of the competition.
That's right. Without the treaty to act as a "brake", China was forging ahead with the development of its rocket weapons, constituting a direct threat to the United States. If such a confrontation came to pass in the future, it is obvious that right at the outset the other side would be at an advantage.
Do you think that we, from the Polish point of view, have already learned that lesson in a broader geopolitical context?
Well, obviously we are not engaged in global politics to the extent that the United States are, and we do not have to convince them to change their approach. However, our challenge lies in continually reminding our ally, that Central-Eastern Europe's security also carries a major global aspect. And that it would be wrong to marginalise it at the cost of other operating theatres. At the moment, even temporary neglect of Poland and the Baltic States would hand Russia an advantage, which it does not have faced with the entire might of the Alliance forces. And certainly Moscow has its own strengths in other aspects, such as a short decision chain and as an authoritarian state it is able to mobilise its armed forces quickly and take advantage of the element of surprise, without taking into account the political fallout. Nonetheless, if it was engaged in a war with the entire potential of the North Atlantic Alliance, the longer such a war would last, the worse for Russia.
Well, let's focus for a moment at what such a scenario could look like. Amongst the details, CSBA is emphasising that in a regional dimension, Russia can successfully engage in the so called anti-access area-denial strategy, using its air superiority, rocket forces, tube artillery and communication systems in order to take over a key area in one coordinated push, cutting off the enemy's reinforcements. Such a fate may be in store for the Suwałki Gap.
NATO's deterrence strategy in Eastern Europe is based on two pillars: a clear, albeit not too numerous rotation of armed forces and – in the event of a conflict – deployment of significant military assets to the region. And this is the root of the problem, as analyst point out that Russia may make it difficult or effectively prevent the deployment of support through the use of the aforementioned rocket and anti-aircraft systems. That anti-access area-denial umbrella would prevent NATO from making use of its full potential within the scope of a key aspect – time. And that, due to geographic and mobilisation ability reasons favours the Kremlin. Therefore, in order to reduce the time during which the opponent has the upper hand, it is necessary to strengthen American presence in the region. To stockpile larger quantities of hardware within the territories of the Eastern flank countries.
According to the Americans, that goal is unattainable without full divisional command in Poland, reinforcing rocket artillery and anti-aircraft defences, enhancing the potential of support units and forming a full. armoured brigade in Europe. In terms of defence needs, is that the most Poland can aim for?
From our point of view, it is worth pointing out that these are realistic expectations and that the plan is achievable. As in my opinion we are dealing with the American elites and defence related circles getting used to the idea that increasing US Army presence is also in the interest of the United States and not just their European allies. However, when considering today's situation, we should not forget where we were as recently as in 2013 and 2014, when countries on NATO's eastern flank were fighting for any kind of American presence. At the time Germany's position was that it would be irresponsible to agitate Putin and that such a move would constitute a breach of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which as we know the Russians broke before that and on numerous occasions. The 2016 Warsaw NATO summit marked an intellectual breakthrough, when a decision for a permanent presence on a rotating basis was made. And now there is a chance – and actually the report which we are talking about suggest that it is already happening – for another breakthrough. If former Pentagon accountants – as these are the people behind CSBA – are talking about the profitability of setting up a permanent divisional command, then that is a good signal.
But is it not contrary to the postulate, increasingly more often articulated by Paris and Berlin, that instead of relying on America, it would be better to build a "European army"? Are Poland's objectives within this scope different from those of the EU's largest countries?
Let's make one thing clear: increasing Europe's defence potential is in the interest of both Europe as well as the US. There is no doubt that the Pentagon is aware that in the long run – despite its growing presence on the Eastern flank – it will have to increasingly rely on an army from the region itself. And that is the aftermath of Trump's philosophy of "pay for your protection", one which is readily heard within opinion shaping circles on the far side of the Atlantic. Unfortunately, the German attitude within the scope of defence independence is somewhat worrying, as a "European army" is discussed in a political rather than military context. And on top of that German politicians are behaving like irresponsible kids on a playground, continuing with their games even though a storm is brewing.
Why is it that despite postulates pertaining to a real increase in the number of American Army soldiers in Poland, US think tanks are not directly referring to the Fort Trump concept? Should we accept that there will not be a single large base?
In my opinion no one has defined Fort Trump as an actual fort, like we know from Westerns.
And it is no secret that Warsaw would love to see a new Rammstein Base built.
Well, in actual fact, it is happening as we speak. More and more units and military equipment are gradually being moved to Poland, new infrastructure is being built. Certainly nothing will be achieved without outlays from our end and that is why we have to be prepared not to expect altruistic offers presented on golden platters. And this brings us back to the start of the interview – both Americans and Poles have to know how to negotiate and evaluate what will actually contribute to increasing security and what funds are to be designated to that end.
Now you sound like George Friedman, who likes to say that if in September 1939, Poland was asked to quote a reasonable price for averting war, the response would have been quite modest. But are we receiving today that which we really want to be spending our money on? When president Duda was talking about Fort Trump in Washington, he meant more than just a dispersed presence and permanent rotation.
I have a feeling that when it comes to this matter, two paradigms collided head on: political and military thinking. The former was designed to generate positive PR around the concept of a permanent military presence and to flatter Donald Trump's ego and the latter would have ultimately helped to improve Poland's security. It seems that looking at it from a military standpoint, as is oft repeated by analysts, a dispersed American presence seems to be more effective that the construction of a central base which would constitute a priority and a relatively easy target for the Russians. The United States did build such sites after World War II, but now in general are moving away from such concepts towards flexibility of its military assets. And that is also highlighted in the doctrine adopted by James Mattis, a former US defence secretary.
Yes, someone was apparently opposed to the Fort Trump concept.
We have to remember that gen. Mattis is a former marine and that naval infantry forces continually rotate and are in permanent readiness all around the world. In his opinion, that is just what American presence on NATO's Eastern flank should be like, as it is more suitable for modern warfare. However, he no longer occupies that position, and from Warsaw's perspective it is imperative to find an intermediate solution, one which would tie the Americans to Poland logistically without Rammstein 2.0. Today, the option to locate heavy equipment and ammunition stores on the Eastern flank seems to be prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic, in order to prevent a situation where all military hardware together with crews have to be moved at the same time. And the Russians would look forward to destabilising such a stretched supply line – the permanent presence in Poland shortens it significantly.
It seems to me that in this context there is an obvious question which has to be asked: Has the Polish government not learned its lesson as it seems to be encouraging a media debate on the central base idea?
Well, I think that is going a step too far. American permanent presence simply had to be given a name, and the Americans like using symbols and acronyms as a form of shorthand. And this one turned out to be so catchy that it introduced an issue into the debate, which can be given structure, form and one which can be considered from a military operational point of view. Nonetheless. looking at it from the Polish perspective, no one was so naive as not to understand that we will have to adapt to the strategic capabilities of the Americans, whilst arguing for the most extensive possible engagement in geographic and hardware terms. In diplomacy this is a normal way to find common ground. However, a mistake with Fort Trump was to clearly identify it with the president, who, despite his power, does not make all the decisions by himself.
Well, yes, it is the Congress which ultimately decides upon Pentagon's budget.
And that's just it! And if the administration of a given president does not have the majority there, a majority which was maintained in the Senate but lost in the House of Representatives, then highly political endeavours may encounter problems, and in particular because Trump became entangled in a bitter conflict in the Congress when it comes to the wall along the border with Mexico. However, at the moment there are no untoward signs from the USA.
Can the American presence in Poland suffer as a result of internal political games within the USA?
It certainly is a game between the administration and the Congress, but one should be aware that strengthening the Eastern flank is a popular subject at the Capitol. And, interestingly, it enjoys support both from the Republicans as well as the Democrats.
Therefore, what is key in these negotiations from the Polish national interest point of view?
We should act effectively and with restraint in order to disappear from the political radar. We cannot be part of an internal American conflict, but at the same time we have to do all we can for the numbers of soldiers to be increasing, talking about bases in a technical context, referring to their advantages for the entire America and not just for a given cabinet or politician. It seems that such reports, which mirror the concepts of CEPA or of the Atlantic Council, we are on the right path. As in Washington, the decision makers are no longer pondering on 'whether' but rather on 'how' and 'by how much' to increase their engagement on NATO's Eastern flank. And if the Polish Army will also manage to improve, by upgrading its aviation, rocket forces and communication facilities, then perhaps we will avoid the wort scenario. American military strategies are based on a 10-15 year period of peace. Let's look at them closely and make our own conclusions, as this is the time when we cannot afford to be idle even for a single month.
Sławomir Dębski – historian, political scientist, analyst. Polish Institute of International Affairs Director.
Tekst opublikowany w Do Rzeczy nr 14/317